Public logs showed roughly 600 license-plate queries involving Marci Bakely and her daughter. XVOA investigates Flock Safety and police surveillance abuse.
I've been reading about the "community of inquiry" in public administration (Shields 2003). The basic principles link to both police investigation practices and democratic principles. And social justice movements. For me, they provide insight into your work.
Ann, now you’ve sent me down a rabbit hole because “community of inquiry” sounds like the exact opposite of the closed loop I keep seeing in police surveillance: police collect the data, police interpret it, police decide whether police crossed the line. I’m going to read Shields. That connection to democratic practice feels important, especially the question of who gets admitted into the inquiry and who is only treated as its subject.
Full confession, I happened upon it via Wikipedia entry on Community of Practice, a concept I am using in my work and wanted to check up on. Here's the link: Shields, Patricia M. (2003). "The community of inquiry: Classical pragmatism and public administration". Administration & Society. 35 (5): 510–538. doi:10.1177/0095399703256160. Check the Wikipedia entry for a link to a plain-text version w/o a paywall.
It’s almost always women harassed in this manner. I will never understand why the “good” police don’t do a better job of policing themselves. They would get much more respect if they weed out their own “rogue” officers instead of always protecting their own.
Pamela, that’s the part that keeps bothering me. The “good officers” argument starts sounding awfully thin when the institution keeps rewarding silence and punishing the person who breaks it. Respect cannot be demanded at badge point. If the public is expected to trust police power, then police have to show us they can confront abuse without closing ranks around it.
“Rogue” officers my ass. Spent a lot of years learning and practicing my profession in managing IT security. One of the basic concepts, and most widely ignored here is about authority and accountability. Authority is the legal ability to collect and store the data. Authority can be delegated. Ownership and accountability cannot be delegated. The data owner is always accountable for misuse. If Flock has ownership, they are accountable for any misuse. If Flock is maintaining data on the behalf of a PD and the PD owns it, the PD is accountable. Whomever is accountable is responsible for determining standards for control of the data and ensuring audit reviews are completed and maintained so that wrongdoing is discovered and punished according to law. At least in the federal sector. The problem is that although federal laws and regs are pretty clear, state and local laws are a patchwork.
Marti, yes, this is the distinction the “rogue officer” defense is trying to bury. Somebody owns the data, somebody set the access rules, and somebody decided what an audit would actually catch. Then the patchwork lets every institution point sideways when the system is abused and, somehow, accountability becomes an orphan even though the surveillance never was.
A friend may be going through this now-and her sense of being followed w limited evidence makes it hard to believe her account. Same pattern -changing routes, having car checked, buying devices to counteract perceived threats esp phone hacking. Some level of isolation trying to minimize risk of being followed, micro-harassment. Hard to explain to police as her concerns can not be documented. Thx for the great analysis. I’ve sent her this piece in hopes of providing some validation for something that may never be addressed appropriately.
Susan, this is the part that gets to me because a pattern can be terrifying to live through and still look flimsy when each incident is separated on paper. Then the person has to prove the pattern while already exhausted by it. I’m glad this gave your friend some language and some validation. I just wish recognition did not arrive so much sooner than protection.
Another outstanding (and enlightening) analysis! Thank you, Xplisset.
I've been reading about the "community of inquiry" in public administration (Shields 2003). The basic principles link to both police investigation practices and democratic principles. And social justice movements. For me, they provide insight into your work.
Ann, now you’ve sent me down a rabbit hole because “community of inquiry” sounds like the exact opposite of the closed loop I keep seeing in police surveillance: police collect the data, police interpret it, police decide whether police crossed the line. I’m going to read Shields. That connection to democratic practice feels important, especially the question of who gets admitted into the inquiry and who is only treated as its subject.
Full confession, I happened upon it via Wikipedia entry on Community of Practice, a concept I am using in my work and wanted to check up on. Here's the link: Shields, Patricia M. (2003). "The community of inquiry: Classical pragmatism and public administration". Administration & Society. 35 (5): 510–538. doi:10.1177/0095399703256160. Check the Wikipedia entry for a link to a plain-text version w/o a paywall.
It’s almost always women harassed in this manner. I will never understand why the “good” police don’t do a better job of policing themselves. They would get much more respect if they weed out their own “rogue” officers instead of always protecting their own.
Pamela, that’s the part that keeps bothering me. The “good officers” argument starts sounding awfully thin when the institution keeps rewarding silence and punishing the person who breaks it. Respect cannot be demanded at badge point. If the public is expected to trust police power, then police have to show us they can confront abuse without closing ranks around it.
“Rogue” officers my ass. Spent a lot of years learning and practicing my profession in managing IT security. One of the basic concepts, and most widely ignored here is about authority and accountability. Authority is the legal ability to collect and store the data. Authority can be delegated. Ownership and accountability cannot be delegated. The data owner is always accountable for misuse. If Flock has ownership, they are accountable for any misuse. If Flock is maintaining data on the behalf of a PD and the PD owns it, the PD is accountable. Whomever is accountable is responsible for determining standards for control of the data and ensuring audit reviews are completed and maintained so that wrongdoing is discovered and punished according to law. At least in the federal sector. The problem is that although federal laws and regs are pretty clear, state and local laws are a patchwork.
https://www.dlapiperdataprotection.com/?c=US
Marti, yes, this is the distinction the “rogue officer” defense is trying to bury. Somebody owns the data, somebody set the access rules, and somebody decided what an audit would actually catch. Then the patchwork lets every institution point sideways when the system is abused and, somehow, accountability becomes an orphan even though the surveillance never was.
A friend may be going through this now-and her sense of being followed w limited evidence makes it hard to believe her account. Same pattern -changing routes, having car checked, buying devices to counteract perceived threats esp phone hacking. Some level of isolation trying to minimize risk of being followed, micro-harassment. Hard to explain to police as her concerns can not be documented. Thx for the great analysis. I’ve sent her this piece in hopes of providing some validation for something that may never be addressed appropriately.
Susan, this is the part that gets to me because a pattern can be terrifying to live through and still look flimsy when each incident is separated on paper. Then the person has to prove the pattern while already exhausted by it. I’m glad this gave your friend some language and some validation. I just wish recognition did not arrive so much sooner than protection.